

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0087

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

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TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMB. JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 18, 1975

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB. JOHNSON AT THE
SALT TWO MEETING OF MAR. 18, 1975.

QUOTE:

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

MARCH 18, 1975

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ELEMENTS OF THE DRAFT AGREE-
MENT WHICH THE U.S. TABLED ON MARCH 5. SPECIFICALLY, I WILL DISCUSS
ARTICLE X AND THE PROTOCOL OF THE U.S. DRAFT, BOTH OF WHICH PERTAIN
TO THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT.

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OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED THAT THE LIMITATIONS IN THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE DRAFT WHICH THE U.S. HAS TABLED IS FORMULATED SO THAT EACH SIDE WILL BE CONFIDENT, UPON ENTERING INTO THE AGREEMENT, THAT SUCH ADEQUATE VERIFICATION CAN BE ASSURED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT. THE PROVISIONS IN THE U.S. DRAFT ARE DIRECTED TOWARD REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTENTION OVER QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE.

II

ARTICLE X OF THE DRAFT IS BASED ON ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE X, WHICH IS IDENTICAL TO THE CORRESPONDING PARAGRAPH OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, PROVIDES THAT THE SIDES SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE INCLUSION OF THIS PARAGRAPH.

PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE X, WHICH IS ALSO CARRIED OVER FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, CONTINUES THE COMMITMENT BY EACH SIDE NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE. I NOTE THAT BOTH DELEGATIONS ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE INCLUSION OF THIS PARAGRAPH.

IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE X OF THE U.S. DRAFT, THE SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS IS ALSO A CONTINUING OBLIGATION DATING FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD IT IS THE U.S. VIEW THAT SUCH CONCEALMENT MEASURES INCLUDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TOTALLY OR EXTENSIVELY COVERING, CONCEALING, COMOUFLAGING, OR BUILDING REPLICAS OR FACSIMILES OF, BALLISTIC MISSILES, THEIR LAUNCHERS, MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORMS, OR BOMBERS.

ALSO IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE X, THE SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO EMPLOY PRACTICES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL SECRET

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MEANS. IN THE U.S. VIEW SUCH PRACTICES INCLUDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TEST AND CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES WHICH CONCEAL OR DISGUISE FROM NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CAPABILITIES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, THEIR LAUNCHERS, MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORMS, OR BOMBERS. THE PRACTICES REFERRED TO HERE INCLUDE THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTING WHICH WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF THE MIRV LIMITATION.

IT IS NOT THE U.S. INTENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNDERTAKINGS I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED REQUIRE THAT THE SIDES CHANGE PRACTICES WHICH WERE IN USE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. ACCORDINGLY THE U.S. DRAFT PROVIDES THAT PRACTICES, INCLUDING TESTING PRACTICES, IN USE PRIOR TO THAT TIME NEED NOT BE CHANGED IN ORDER TO CONFORM WITH THOSE UNDERTAKINGS.

III

I WILL NEXT TURN TO THE PROTOCOL TO THE U.S. DRAFT. AS I HAVE MENTIONED BEFORE AND AS IS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT, THIS PROTOCOL IS TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE U.S. HAS IDENTIFIED SOME PROBLEMS RELATED TO ITS ABILITY ADEQUATELY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRV LIMITATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WE HAVE PRESENTED THESE PROBLEMS TO YOU AND HAVE SOUGHT, AND STILL SEEK, YOUR COOPERATION IN A JOINT SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT IDENTIFYING AND IMPLEMENTING SUCH SOLUTIONS IS IMPORTANT, SO THAT BOTH SIDES CAN ENTER INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THE MIRV LIMITATION WILL BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE OVER THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT.

THE PROTOCOL TO THE U.S. DRAFT REPRESENTS OUR BEST EFFORTS AT RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS WE PERCEIVE IN VERIFYING THE MIRV LIMITATIONS. PARAGRAPH 1 REPRESENTS THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS, SLBMS, AND ASBMS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. PARAGRAPH 2 STIPULATES WHEN LAUNCHERS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. PARAGRAPH 3 SPECIFIES THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A LAUNCHER FOR A MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WILL

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NO LONGER BE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION. I WILL NOW DISCUSS THESE PROVISIONS IN MORE DETAIL.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0087

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THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN SUBPARAGRAPH 1(A) OF THE PROTOCOL IS OUR SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING WHETHER OR NOT A FIXED ICBM LAUNCHER CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE, IF THAT LAUNCHER WAS INITIALLY CONSTRUCTED, OR HAS BEEN CONVERTED THROUGH CHANGES IN LENGTH OR DIAMETER OR THROUGH OTHER MODIFICATIONS, SO AS TO PERMET THE DEPLOYMENT ON THAT LAUNCHER OF A MIRVED MISSILE. THE PROVISION STATES THAT ALL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS SO CONSTRUCTED OR CONVERTED WILL BE CONSIDERED AS SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION OF ARTICLE IV OF THE AGREEMENT. TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY WITH RESPECT TO WHICH LAUNCHERS MEET THIS CRITERION, THE FORMULATION IN THE DRAFT SPECIFIES THE DATES AFTER WHICH FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS SO CONSTRUCTED OR CONVERTED WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION. ACCORDINGLY, ALL LAUNCHERS OF TYPES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOVIET ICBMS WE CALL THE SS-17, SS-18, AND SS-19 WILL BE INCLUDED UNDER THE AGGREGATE CEILING ON LAUNCHERS FOR MIRVED MISSILES.

SUBPARAGRAPH 1(B) IS OUR SOLUTION TO A SIMILAR PROBLEM, THAT OF CONVERTED SLBM LAUNCHERS. THE SOLUTION PROVIDED IS ESSENTIALLY THE SECRET

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SAME AS FOR CONVERTED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

SUBPARAGRAPH 1(C) IS CONCERNED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WITH THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING WHETHER OR NOT AN SLBM LAUNCHER ON A SUBMARINE OF A GIVEN CLASS CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE, WHEN BOTH MIRVED AND NON MIRVED SLBMS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH LAUNCHERS ON SUBMARINES OF THAT CLASS. THE PROVISION STATES THAT, IF A MIRVED MISSILE HAS BEEN

DEPLOYED ON AN SLBM LAUNCHER ON ANY SUBMARINE OF A GIVEN CLASS, THEN THE SLBM LAUNCHERS ON ALL SUBMARINES OF THAT CLASS WILL BE CONSIDERED AS SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION.

THE PROVISIONS WHICH I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED ARE FORMULATED TO SOLVE CERTAIN PROBLEMS WE PERCEIVE WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION OF THE MIRV LIMITATION. RECOGNIZING THAT EITHER SIDE COULD HAVE OTHER LAUNCHERS CONTAINING MIRVED MISSILES, WHICH DO NOT GIVE RISE TO THESE PARTICULAR VERIFICATION PROBLEMS, SUBPARAGRAPH 1(D) STIPULATES THAT ALL OTHER LAUNCHERS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED ICBMS, SLBMS, AND ASBMS ALSO WILL BE CONSIDERED AS SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION.

PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE PROTOCOL SPECIFIES WHEN LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO LAUNCHERS FOR MIRVED MISSILES. IT USES AS A BASIS THE CRITERIA PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE III, WHICH SPECIFY WHEN SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT BECOME SUBJECT TO ITS LIMITATIONS. IN THE CASES OF FIXED AND MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND ASBM LAUNCHERS, THE CRITERION FOR INCLUDING A CONVERTED LAUNCHER UNDER THE MIRV LIMITATION IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT FOR INCLUDING A NEW LAUNCHER UNDER THE OVERALL AGGREGATE LIMITATION. HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF CONVERTED ALBM LAUNCHERS, THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION WHEN THE FIRST SUBMARINE OF A CLASS CARRYING SUCH LAUNCHERS FIRST GOES TO SEA AFTER CONVERSION.

THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE PROTOCOL DEALS WITH THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING WHETHER OR NOT A LAUNCHER CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE, IF THAT LAUNCHER PREVIOUSLY CONTAINED A MIRVED MISSILE, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY WAS CONVERTED TO A LAUNCHER FOR A MISSILE NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. PARAGRAPH 3 PROVIDES THAT SUCH A LAUNCHER CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION UNTIL IT IS DESTROYED, DISMANTLED, OR CONVERTED PURSUANT TO PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, TO A LAUNCHER WHICH IS NOT CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A MIRVED

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MISSILE.

MR. MINISTER, I WANT TO REPEAT THAT THE SOLUTIONS WHICH WE HAVE OFFERED TO THE PROBLEMS WE PERCEIVE IN ADEQUATELY VERIFYING THE MIRV LIMITATION MAY NOT BE THE ONLY ONES. THEY REPRESENT THE BEST EFFORTS OF THE U.S. SIDE IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WELCOME ANY ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS, AND I ASSURE YOU THAT SUCH PROPOSALS WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY THE U.S.

UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

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